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Even though Australia has experienced frequent and large commodity export price shocks like the
Third World, it seems to have dealt with the volatility better. Why? This paper explores Australian
terms of trade volatility since 1901. It identifies two major price shock episodes before the recent mining-led
boom and bust. It assesses their relative magnitude, their de-industrialization and distributional impact,
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent research shows that external price volatility -- terms of trade volatility in 
particular -- has a negative impact on long run growth (Fatas and Mihov 2006; Blattman, 
Hwang and Williamson 2007; Koren and Tenreyro 2007; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 
2007; Williamson 2008).
1 Yet, Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2007) document that 
between 1870 and 1940 the negative impact of terms of trade volatility on economic 
growth was far greater in commodity dependent Latin America, Africa and Asia than it 
was in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, even though in some 
cases the magnitude of the price volatility was even larger. Indeed, they find no evidence 
to support the view that terms of trade volatility significantly lowered long run growth in 
the English-speaking European offshoots at all between 1870 and 1940.   
What are the secrets of this long run success of the English-speaking offshoots? 
Was it because their factor markets were better able to respond to external shocks? Was it 
because of better policy or better institutions? Was it because their governments had 
more stable revenues so as to pursue long run infrastructure investment without 
interruption? Was it because the offshoots were better able to diversify (especially in to 
manufacturing) and thus to mute the impact of the external price shocks? And what was 
the impact of these price shocks on income distribution? These questions await answers. 
Not only should the explanations be of interest to economic historians and development 
                                                 
1 Blattman et al. (2007) focus on the period 1870 to 1939, and Williamson (2008) on the period 
1780-1913, whereas all the other papers cited in the text focus on the post-1960 period. Some of the early 
research on the impact of term of trade volatility on long-run growth are Mendoza (1997), Deaton and 
Miller (1996), Kose and Reizman (2001), Bleaney and Greenway (2001), and Hadass and Williamson 
(2003).   3
economists, but they may also offer useful lessons for Australian policy makers dealing 
with the present mining boom and bust. It may also have implications for economic 
development in poor African, Asian and Latin American countries where price volatility 
is frequently documented as a fundamental drag on development (Loayza et al., 2007).    
  We approach these questions from a country perspective. The paper focuses on 
Australian terms of trade history since federation in 1901. It identifies two major price 
shock episodes before the recent mining-led episode, and assesses their relative 
magnitude, their de-industrialization and distributional impact, factor market responses 
and policy behaviour. In doing so, we are able to learn what external price shocks did to 
resource allocation, development and distribution in the Australian 20
th century, and thus 
to understand more about what it might do at the start of the Australian 21
st century.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports the 
complete terms of trade time series since 1901. We identify major episodes of shocks in 
the net barter terms of trade, as well as in the prices of tradables relative to all 
commodities, including non-tradables. We compare average volatility across major 
Australian episodes, identify the most volatile episodes, identify which Australian export 
commodities had the greatest price volatility, and whether export product concentration 
played a role. Furthermore, we compare Australian commodity price volatility with that 
of other commodity exporters. Section 3 explores Australian factor market response to 
these shocks, primarily the regional impact on employment and migration. The income 
distributional impact is explored at length and compared across episodes in Section 4.  
Section 5 takes a close look at Australian policy response. In particular, it assesses 
government deficits and surpluses, government infrastructure investment, and tariff   4
policy across these episodes. Did Australia use tariffs as a device to offset de-
industrialization forces generated by commodity export price booms? Did Australia 
governments use revenue booms to accumulate, and revenue busts to spend? Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  A Century of Australian Terms of Trade Shocks 
 
Measuring Price Volatility 
This section starts by comparing Australian experience with export price booms 
with one other English-speaking offshoot, the United States, and then with two late 
comers, Brazil and Indonesia. We conclude the section by comparing Australian export 
price volatility with all Third World primary product exporters. 
When Australian commodity price shocks are compared with other commodity 
exporting countries (both rich and poor), two different patterns emerge. First, the 
Australian and the United States (which used to be a rich commodity exporter) terms of 
trade moved together during the last half of the 19
th and the first third of the 20
th century 
(Figure 1). This correlation continues until the Great Depression when the United States 
terms of trade improved and the Australian terms of trade slumped. In addition, Australia 
and the United States exhibited quite different behaviour in the two decades after 1980 
(Figure 2), and during the Australian mining boom since the late 1990s, when the US 
terms of trade shows no rise. Australian terms of trade movements during the second half 
of the 19
th century and after appear to be similar to the terms of trade movement in Brazil 
and Indonesia (Figure 3). The fact that agricultural raw material and foodstuff prices   5
show some co-movement may account for similar terms of trade timing for the three 
economies. But here again, the correlation breaks down after 1980. Relatively high but 
declining Indonesian terms of trade during the first half of the 1980s following the oil 
crisis of the 1970s is not matched by Australia or Brazil (Figure 4). The recent Australian 
mining-driven terms of trade boom has not been replicated in Indonesia or Brazil.  
So much for timing. What about comparative magnitudes? Has Australia 
undergone greater or less volatility in its export prices and terms of trade than have other 
commodity exporters? We know it did not undergo less volatility during the seven 
decades before 1940. Blattman et al. (2007) have shown that the average terms of trade 
volatility in Australia over the period 1870 to 1939 was greater than all countries in the 
European periphery,
2 most of Latin America,
3 and the majority of countries in Asia and 
the Middle East.
4 Since 1960, Australian terms of trade volatility, while no longer 
greater, has been only marginally less than that of other commodity exporting regions. 
During the 1970s, external price volatility in Australia – defined as the standard deviation 
of the logarithmic change in terms of trade -- was as much as three-fifths of that of Sub-
Saharan Africa and more than four-fifths of that of Latin America (Table 1), two regions 
that the development literature characterizes as greatly disadvantaged by price volatility 
(Deaton and Miller 1996). Australian terms of trade volatility was also similar to other 
commodity exporting regions in the 1980s, although it was less so in the 1990s. Note 
also, that in every decade from the 1960s to the 1990s, Australian terms of trade volatility 
                                                 
2The European periphery includes Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Serbia, 
and Spain.  
3The Latin American exceptions were Brazil, Colombia, and Cuba.  
4The Asian and Middle Eastern exceptions were Ceylon, Egypt, and Indonesia.      6
was more than double that of the average for all industrial economies. The Australian 
volatility figure for 2000-07 seems less than that of previous decades, but Table 1 only 
reports the boom up to 2007; it does not report the recent price collapse in commodity 
markets. While Australian base metal prices rose by an immense 321 percent between 
1998/99 and the peak in May 2007, by November 2008 it had tumbled to only 47 percent 
of that peak. Meanwhile, the Australian dollar collapsed from almost par with the US 
dollar (0.96) in June 2008 to 0.67 in October 2008. 
   
Table 1: Comparative Trends in Volatility of Terms of Trade Growth 
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1970 – 79 
1980 – 89 
1990 – 99 






























Notes: The Australian figures are our own calculation. Figures for other country groups are inferred from 
Figure 3 in Loayza et al. (2007), p. 346. Volatility of terms of trade growth is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the logarithmic change in terms of trade over each of the four decades 1960–2000.  
 
Thus, it appears that for more than a century, Australia has experienced about as 
volatile a terms of trade as the average commodity exporter. How was it that Australia 
seemed to handle these shocks so well? 
 
Identifying Episodes 
Figure 5 reports the Australian net barter terms of trade (PX/PM) between 1890 and 
2007. In addition, two other variables are plotted there, PX/PY and PM/PY. The ratio of   7
export to import prices is the standard measure of the terms of trade. However, in order to 
assess the impact of external price shocks on the economy as a whole, the prices of those 
two tradables should be related to the prices of non-tradables as well. That is, a 
commodity export price boom (or bust) must be expressed relative to all other prices in 
the domestic economy in order to assess its impact on resource allocation, output mix and 
income distribution. Hence, the external terms of trade does not by itself offer an 
adequate measure of export price booms and busts relative to the rest of the economy. 
More effective measures are PX/PY and PM/PY where y P  is the GDP implicit price deflator. 
It makes a difference in what follows. 
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Notes: These figures are our own calculation. All growth rates are in percent. The average real GDP 
growth rates are annualized averages of log difference in these variables. The data sources are documented 
in the Data Appendix. 
 
Australia has undergone three major external price shock episodes over the past 
century. As Table 2 documents, the first half of the 1920s experienced a sharp increase in 
Australian export prices and thus in the external terms of trade, PX/PM. What is surprising,   8
however, is that PX/PY hardly increased at all.
5 Note also that the long boom and 
subsequent bust in the terms of trade from the late 1890s to the end of World War I 
(Figure 5) disappears when PX and PM are deflated by PY. The cycle from World War I to 
the mid 1920s is, however, apparent in all three series, and it also coincides with a strong 
real GDP growth performance of 6.5 percent per annum (Pope 1987; p. 35). Note also 
that the terms of trade bust in the second half of the 1920s coincided with negative GDP 
per capita growth, five years before the Great Depression hit. The second major price 
shock occurred during the Korean War episode from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, 
when PX/PM and PX/PY growth were both double-digit (Table 2). Yet, the price bust seems 
to have left no mark on aggregate economic performance: the GDP growth rate was three 
times as fast during the 1950-1955 price bust than during the 1945-1950 price boom. 
Finally, the third major price shock is what we have seen since 2003 (or even 1998), 
when the average GDP growth rate rose again, this time to 2.6 percent per annum. Each 
of the two previous export price booms were followed by an equally dramatic price 
collapse. Of course, we do not yet know whether the current collapse in commodity 
exports will persist, but so far it appears that the recent boom will also be followed by a 
dramatic bust. Whether the price bust will drag Australian growth performance down – as 
in the late 1920s, or not – as in the early 1950s, is yet to be seen, although a world 
recession will certainly obscure those forces.  
What about the magnitudes of these shocks? How large are they when compared 
across episodes? During the first boom between 1920 and 1925, the total increase in PX/PY 
                                                 
5 Over the period 1921 to 1924, PX/PM rose approximately 94.5 percentage points compared to 4.1 
percentage point increase in PX/PY over the same period.    9
was 4.1 percentage points and the average year to year change was 0.8 percent. During 
the Korean War boom up to 1950, the total increase in PX/PY was 80.3 percentage points, 
and the annual rate was a huge 16.1 percent. For the year 1949 to 1950 alone, the increase 
was over 48.4 percentage points. On the down side between 1950 and 1955, the figure 
was a huge annual rate of -10 percent. Without a doubt, the Korean War episode recorded 
the largest boom and bust in export prices over the last century (see also Maddock 1987). 
The recent export price boom seems pretty modest compared with the Korean episode, 
but pretty dramatic compared with the 1920s. Between 2003 and 2007, the annual rate of 
increase in PX/PY was 2 percent, compared with 0.8 percent in the early 1920s and 16.1 
percent in the late 1940s.  
Were these three Australian price shocks driven by the export price of a 
particularly volatile commodity, or by the fortuitous co-movement of many export 
commodity prices? To address this question, Figure 6 plots PXW/PY, PXM/PY, and PXA/PY 
where xw P ,  xm P , and  xa P  are export prices of wool, mining, and agriculture goods 
respectively. Table 2 also reports the average growth rates of these three commodity 
prices during these episodes. The export price boom between 1920 and 1925 was driven 
solely by wool prices. The export price of agriculture goods and mineral prices 
underwent no boom at all, but rather a decline. The Korean War commodity price episode 
was also driven by wool prices, but on this occasion both mining and agriculture prices 
also experienced a sharp increase and subsequent collapse. Like the 1920s, the recent 
price boom 2003-2007 was also mainly driven by one set of commodities, minerals, since 
the export prices of wool and agriculture actually declined up to 2007. Thus, two things 
made the Korean War boom unusual: the magnitude of the price boom was unusually   10
great for all three products; and the co-movement of all three was unusually pronounced. 
It appears that there is little that is unusual about the recent commodity export price boom 
(and bust): the magnitude of the recent boom in mining product prices exceeded that of 
wool in the early 1920s but fell well short of the Korean War boom in the same product; 
and the fact that the recent boom involved only one product price (minerals), was also 
shared by the early 1920s. Once again, if we are looking for an unusual commodity price 
boom and bust over the past Australian century, it is the Korean War, not the current 
episode. 
A comparison of export product concentration during the three episodes reveals 
that indeed wool was the dominant export commodity during the 1920s. More than 70 
percent of Australian exports were primary products with wool making up more than half 
of it (Table 3).
6 Therefore, the 1920-1925 boom would have been driven by wool prices 
even if the relative prices of mining and agricultural products had behaved the same way 
(which, of course, they did not). Wool could claim an even more dominant position in the 
export product mix by the Korean War, although residual exports (which included 
manufactures) gained at the expense of mining and agriculture. However the world 
commodity boom led to the expansion of all Australian export sectors, including wool, 
mining, and agriculture, even though the wool price boom was much more dramatic than 
that of mining and agriculture. In contrast, the recent commodity boom (and bust) has 
been dominated by mining and the residual sector. Mining accounts for almost half of 
                                                 
6 Bambrick (1973) also documents that the export price index for 1890 to 1930 was dominated by 
the major export commodity, wool. Cashin and Mcdermott (2002) show that, in Australia, the wool export 
cycle was in synchronization with the business cycle prior to World War I. This link became weaker after 
the war.   11
Australian exports. Wool and agriculture no longer appear to be important export items, 
mining prices are doing all the work. 
Furthermore, the residual export category – mainly manufactures – has served to 
offset the volatility in the three commodities. Indeed, throughout the 20
th century, as 
Australia industrialized, the export mix increasingly shifted towards manufactures, from 
28.4 percent of the export total in 1920-25 to 48.2 percent in 2003-07. Thus, while export 
commodity price volatility is still an Australia attribute, its impact has diminished across 
the 20
th century due to industrialization and post-industrial forces: first, reducing export 
concentration, and raising the manufacturing export share (with more stable prices); and 
second, reducing the relative size of agriculture and mining activity in the economy, both 
serving to mute the impact of export price volatility in Australian markets.
7 
 
Table 3: Export Product Concentration in Australia during the  
Three Episodes (%) 
Years Wool  Mining  Agriculture  Others 
1920 – 25 
1945 – 50 













Notes: These figures are our own calculation using Vamplew (1987), pp. 194 – 195 for 1920 to 1925 and 
pp. 202-203 for 1945 to 1950. They are percentage share of total exports during each period. Figures for the 
period 2003 to 2007 are calculated using ABS cat no. 53680, Table 12b. 
 
3.  Australian Market Response to the Terms of Trade Shocks 
Having established that the Australian economy experienced three major terms of 
trade booms (the early twenties, the Korean War, and the recent mining boom) and three 
major busts (the late 1920s and the Great Depression, and the long price bust from 1951 
                                                 
7 Martin (1989) shows that, since 1970, Australia’s exports are considerably more diversified and 
therefore substantially reduces the variability in terms of trade.     12
to 1973, and the recent months), how has the Australian market responded? We explore 
two responses. First, we look at the impact of these shocks on the structure of the 
economy both in terms of employment and output. Is there any evidence of de-
industrialisation during the terms of trade booms, and industrial recovery during the 
slumps? We answer this question by constructing an index of structural change and also 
by looking at manufacturing employment and output time series. Second, we look at the 
impact of these price shocks on factor markets. 
The structural change index is constructed using the formula St = Σi wi |gi,t − gt| , 
where wi are value added weights, gi and g are one year growth rates of individual 
industrial sectors and aggregate respectively both in terms of employment and GDP 
(Hatton 2007; Hatton and Boyer 2005). These two indices range between zero (when all 
sectors grow at the same rate as the aggregate and hence there is no structural change) 
and one. The SCHEMP index captures structural change in sectoral employment and the 
(SCHGDP) index captures structural change in sectoral output (Data Appendix). The 
maximum values of these indices for the corresponding period are presented in Table 4. 
With the exception of output during the 1920s and employment during the Korean War 
episode, there is very little evidence of significant differences in the rate of structural 
change on the upswing versus the downswing during these three price shocks. True, 
SCHGDP fell from a high 14 percent in the early 1920s to a somewhat lower 9 percent in 
the late 1920s, but there were no such differences on either side of the price peaks in the 
other two episodes. Similarly, while SCHEMP fell from a high 16 percent in the late 
1940s to a much lower 3 percent in the early 1950s, there were no such differences on 
either side of the price peaks in the other two episodes. The current boom has, thus far,   13
exhibited no structural adjustment response at all, at least as measured by SCHGDP or 
SCHEMP.  
 
Table 4: External Price Shocks and Structural Change in the Australian Economy 
Years  Structural Change in GDP 
(SCHGDP) 
Structural Change in 
Employment 
(SCHEMP) 
1920 – 25 
1925 – 30 
1945 – 50 
1950 – 55 
2000 – 03 













Notes:  Definitions of SCHGDP and SCHEMP are available from the Data Appendix. The numbers 
reported above are maximum values of the index reached during the corresponding period. 
 
Figure 7 also plots the deviations from long run trend in the manufacturing 
sector’s employment and GDP shares from 1890 to 2007. The manufacturing sector share 
exhibits a century-long inverted U reflecting a half century of manufacturing-led growth 
(and shrinking agriculture) followed by a half century of service-led growth (and 
shrinking manufacturing). The peak approximately coincides with the Korean War 
episode. Due to the effect of the secular increase in manufacturing, it appears that the 
commodity price shocks had very little impact on deindustrialisation or reindustrialisation 
during Australia’s biggest commodity price boom and bust. There are two possible 
explanations for this result. The first would lie with the fact that the underlying 
development fundamentals – favoring manufacturing -- completely swamped the impact 
of the commodity price shocks between 1945 and 1955. The second explanation would 
be that factor markets did not play the allocative roles we expect of them. These two 
explanations need not be competing. In any case, the same appears to have been true of   14
the recent mining boom and bust. The only exception to this rule appears to have been the 
1920s (Figure 7 and Table 4) where there does seem to be evidence of deindustrialisation 
on the commodity price upswing and reindustrialisation on the downswing. This 
exception is all the more surprising given that the great terms of trade boom and bust in 
the 1920s was, as we have seen, much more modest when PX and PM are both deflated by 
PY, the GDP implicit price deflator (Table 2). 
What suppressed deindustrialisation during the commodity price booms and 
reindustrialisation during the price slumps? To repeat, was it because long run 
development fundaments swamped the impact of commodity price booms and busts, or 
was it because of factor immobility? Conventional wisdom suggests that there should be 
an influx of foreign labour during terms of trade upswings and exodus during 
downswings (Hatton and Williamson 1998: Chapter. 4), and that foreign and domestic 
migrants should both favour the resource-intensive regions on the upswings and 
disfavour them on the downswing. These labour market effects should have been more 
pronounced the greater was labour mobility. Was this the case with the three Australian 
commodity price episodes across the 20
th century? There was an Australian immigration 
boom in the 1920s, but it seems to have lagged behind the commodity price boom by a 
half decade (compare Tables 1 and Table 5). And while Western Australia, South 
Australia and Queensland were more heavily specialized in wool and agriculture, only 
Western Australia reported relatively heavy immigration rates compared with the national 
average between 1920 and 1925. Furthermore, Western Australia had far higher 
immigration rates during the bust in the late 1920s (16.7), than during the boom in the 
early 1920s (9.3), and the immigration rates reported for Queensland were hardly   15
different on either side of the price spike (5.9 vs 5.2). Thus, migration did not play the 
consistent and powerful role during the first export commodity price event that a mobile 
labour market would have predicted. This perverse result was even more notable during 
the Korean War period: while Western Australia and South Australia were both above the 
national immigration average 1945-50, Queensland was below it; and all three regions 
had greater immigration rates during the bust after 1950, than during the boom up to 
1950. Similar migration patterns have continued during the current mining boom: while 
resource-abundant Queensland underwent much higher immigration rates than the rest of 
Australia, and while resource-scarce New South Wales recorded low growth rates, none 
of the remaining four states show a significant change between 2000-02 and after. In 
short, either labour markets have not responded with sufficient power to create de-
industrialization during the commodity price booms and re-industrialisation during the 
slumps, or other forces have offset those forces over the past century. 
      
Table 5: External Price Shocks and Net Interstate and Overseas Migration Rate     
Years Australia  New  South 
Wales 




1920 – 25 
1925 – 30 
1945 – 50 
1950 – 55 






































Notes: Prior to 1972, net overseas migration was defined as the difference between total arrivals and total 
departures, including short-term movements.  From 1972 onwards net overseas migration is defined as the 
difference between permanent and long-term arrivals and permanent and long-term departures, plus an 
adjustment for category jumping from 1976. It is calculated as the number of net movements in a year per 
1,000 of the estimated resident mean population. From 1994, the mid-year population has been used instead 
of the mean population. Source: Australian Historical Population Statistics (cat no. 3105.0.65.001), Table 
65, Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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Now consider the behaviour of unemployment rates across states. Since Western 
Australia, South Australia and Queensland specialised in resource-intensive activities, a 
commodity price boom should have generated high employment and low unemployment 
rates there compared to Victoria and New South Wales, where more manufacturing was 
located,  if  labour was relatively immobile. If instead labour was very mobile, then 
unemployment rates would have been similar across states in level and change. Table 6 
reports state unemployment rates for the three episodes of external price shocks. The 
immobile labour thesis seems to be confirmed. During the first half of the 1920s, the 
unemployment rates in Western Australia and South Australia were well below the 
national average, but Queensland was above it. During the price bust 1925-30, 
Queensland and Western were still below the national average in spite of the price bust, 
but South Australia was above it. This mixed and ambiguous result is also confirmed for 
the more industrial states during the boom: employment rates in New South Wales were 
above the national average (5.9) but they were below it in Victoria (4.2).  
 
Table 6: External Price Shocks and Unemployment Rates in Australia     
Years Australia  New  South 
Wales 




1920 – 25 
1925 – 30 
1945 – 50 
1950 – 55  
2000 – 04 





































Notes:  Unemployment rates are defined as average unemployed per year as a percentage of total 
workforce. Data are from Leigh and McLeish (2009). 
 
Similarly, while unemployment rates were lower in Queensland and South Australia 
during the commodity export price boom 1945-50, resource-abundant Western Australia   17
was above the Australian average while industrial Victoria was below it. Furthermore, the 
unemployment rates show mixed performance between the industrial and resource-
abundant states after the price boom as well. 
To sum up, the Australian labour market response to the external price shocks did 
not follow the predictions of conventional theory, at least systematically. We find very 
little evidence of structural change and industrial response during these price shocks, 
suggesting that long run economic fundamentals were swamping them. In addition, we 
find very little evidence that labour markets were responsive to these price shocks: labour 
migration during commodity price booms and busts was modest and inconsistent.  
    
4. Australian Distributional Response to Terms of Trade Shocks 
 
How did these price shocks influence Australian income distribution? 
 
Distribution Responses since 1921 
Constructing a time series for the complete Australian income distribution from 
Federation onwards is impossible due to the paucity of reliable data going back that far. 
However, some of the earlier research on long-term trends suggests that while there were 
short-run fluctuations in earnings dispersion between 1914 and 1980, they were not very 
large nor consistently related to commodity export price experience (Norris, 1977: p. 484; 
Maddock et al.1984: p. 19). Thus, any short-run impact of external price shocks on the 
earnings distribution must have been brief and very modest. This result would hardly be 
surprising if Australia’s export sectors had roughly the same labour and skill intensity as   18
the average of the rest of the economy. Under those circumstances, changes in wage 
inequality would be manifested only by regional differences in average annual labour 
earnings between those states specialising in resource-intensive exports and the others. 
Thus, a weak connection between earnings distribution and export commodity price 
shocks might have been expected. Property income and top shares in total income are, 
however, another matter entirely. 
Based on Atkinson and Leigh’s (2007) evidence, Figure 8 plots income shares of 
the top 1 percent, 0.05 percent and 0.01 percent of the richest Australians since 1921. The 
most notable feature there is the long run 20
th century decline in this inequality measure, 
an event shared by almost all industrial countries (Atkinson and Piketty 2008; see also 
Gordon and Dew-Becker 2008). The second notable feature of Figure 8 is the rise in 
inequality between the 1970s and 1990s, again a feature shared by most other industrial 
economies. There have been, however, two distinct departures from those long-run trends 
in Australia: the Korean War commodity price boom and bust, and the recent mining-led 
boom, where inequality kept rising after the 1990s, while it levelled out elsewhere. It 
seems quite clear that commodity price booms have driven up Australian income shares 
at the top, and that the subsequent busts have erased their big gains, at least based on two 
of the three commodity price episodes. Unfortunately, the Atkinson and Leigh data only 
reach back to 1921. While we do see a sharp decline in the top shares in the late 1920s, 
we cannot be sure that the high shares in the early 1920s were, in fact, higher than what 
preceded it.  
 
   19
Distribution Responses before 1921 
We can, however, fill in the pre-1921 distribution blanks with a useful proxy. 
Suppose trends in land rents are a good proxy for income at the top – at least for Australia 
before the 1930s when mining and manufacturing activities were relatively modest. 
Under these conditions, the ratio of land rents to wages (r/w) ought to be a good index of 
pre-1921 trends in the relative incomes of the rich at the top. What, then, ought to be the 
connection between the terms of trade and the rental-wage ratio? The relevant theory can 
be found in the work done in the 1970s by Max Corden and Fred Gruen (1970), Bob 
Gregory (1976), and Ronald Jones (1979). The models are simple, but they isolate what 
should be important. An increase in the price of the land-intensive export commodity (PX) 
shifts its isoprice curve outwards, land rents rise, and labour is pulled out of labour-
intensive manufacturing to work in the export sector. The rental-wage ratio and, 
presumably, the top income shares, rise.  
We can be a little more precise. Suppose the commodity export sector uses mobile 
labour, earning the wage w as before, and sector-specific land (R), earning the rent r as 
before. Suppose further that the manufacturing sector uses mobile labour and sector-
specific capital (K), the latter earning a profit rate i. Now, introduce a commodity price 
shock to the economy by raising its terms of trade, PX/PM. It must follow that 
r* > PX* > w* > PM* > i*, 
where Z* refers to the rate of change in Z. The inequality states that changes in the 
returns to the sector-specific factors (land and capital) are much more pronounced than 
the return to the mobile factor (labour), a formal result that makes good intuitive sense. 
After all, while a mobile factor can emigrate from a sector absorbing a bad price shock,   20
an immobile sector-specific factor (like arable land, mineral resources or industrial 
capital) cannot. Furthermore, the rental-wage ratio responds as 
(r* - w*) = Δ (PX* - PM*) 
where then size of Δ > 1 depends, among other things, on the relative size of the 
commodity export sector. When it was big in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, Δ was 
also big; when it is small a century later in the current boom, Δ is also small.  
  So much for theory. What about fact? The prices of commodity exports 
underwent great volatility but generally boomed up to 1914, and so did the terms of trade 
of those countries which specialized in those products, including Australia (Williamson 
2008). Furthermore, the rental-wage ratio was highly correlated with those terms of trade 
movements. Indeed, when the determinants of r/w are estimated in a 19-country sample 
1870-1940 using country fixed effects, the coefficient (Δ) on PX/PM is +1.78 for the 
English-speaking European overseas countries (significant at 5%: Williamson 2002: 
Table 5). If changes in the rental-wage ratio are a good proxy for changes in the top 
income share pre-1921, then the data in Table 7 imply the following: the top shares did 
rise to peaks in the mid 1920s from a low in 1920, but the top shares were probably even 
bigger during the war years when the terms of trade was also higher. 
There is one final complication to consider. Is it changes in industrial (and service 
sector) profits (iK) or agricultural or mining rents (rR) that are likely to dominate changes 
in the top shares? The answer depends, of course, on the structure of the economy. Where 
the commodity export sector is a big share in GDP and manufacturing (and modern 
services) is small, rR/iK will also be big, and so changes rR will dominate changes in the 
top shares. We think this was likely before the 1930s when the primary sector was big.   21
Symmetrically, where rR/iK is small, changes in rR will have a smaller impact on 
changes in the top shares. This has certainly been true for the early 21
st century, as 
Australia has become a post-industrial society. We also think it was true of the 1940s and 
1950s when the industrial sector was at its peak. 
 
    Table 7: Terms of Trade, Rent-Wage Ratio and Top Income Shares, 1914-1925 
Year  Terms of Trade  
Rent-Wage 




















































Source: Terms of trade from the Appendix; rent-wage ratio from the data underlying Williamson (2002); 
and top shares from Atkinson and Leigh (2007). 
Unfortunately, we do not have the relevant data which could exactly track rR/iK 
over time. However, we can certainly measure the relative importance of the primary 
sector, the manufacturing sector, and the service sector. Such evidence can at least serve 
as an indirect test of our conjectures about the evolution of rR/iK across the 20
th century. 
In 1925, the manufacturing sector was only half the size of the primary sector
8 (Vamplew 
1987: 133), while by 1956 manufacturing’s share in GDP had increased to 28 percent and 
the primary sector had fallen to 18.2 percent (Maddock and McLean 1987: 19), or one 
and a half times the size of the primary sector. This structural transformation over just 
three decades was spectacular. After the 1970s, the primary sector share stabilized at 
                                                 
8 The primary sector is defined as the sum of agriculture and mining.    22
about 10 percent, and the service sector share had reached 41 percent, evidence which 




5.  Australian Policy Response to Terms of Trade Shocks 
 
How did Australian policy react to these terms of trade shocks? Were higher 
tariffs used to protect Australian industry during the commodity price booms? Was the 
additional revenue generated by price booms used for infrastructure investments in the 
more industrial states? Did the commonwealth government tackle regional imbalance by 
subsidising slumping states with revenues generated by booming states? If so, were these 
subsidies and bounties big as a share in total revenue? 
The time series in Figure 9 shows that there was a sharp increase in tariffs during 
and following the great Australian tariff debates in the early 1920s (Coleman and Tyers 
2005) when commodity export prices boomed. Lloyd (2008) documents that the 1921 
Customs or Greene Tariff increased rates on industries that had grown during World War 
I: the tariffs met with very little resistance as the proponents of protectionism used 
defence and national pride in the young  manufacturing sector as additional justifications 
for protection (Anderson 1987). We suspect that it also got votes from the export-
booming states by appealing to fairness. Tariffs were raised still further during the years 
leading up to depression, and after the commodity price bust, following Brigden’s (1925) 
proposition that protection raises real wages, labor’s living standards, and the share of the 
workforce employed in high wage jobs. Brigden’s supporters favoured using protection 
                                                 
9 Calculated from the RBA Bulletin Statistics (Table G10).   23
as a redistributive policy instrument over directly taxing land rents – which had been 
booming from the Great War to the mid 1920s (Table 7) -- as they thought the latter 
would have been politically infeasible (Anderson 1987). 
During the Korean War period, there was one brief but very big increase in 
average duties between 1951 and 1952 amounting to 11 percentage points (Figure 9). 
However, Lloyd (2008) argues that this tariff rate increase was because of an increase in 
imports of dutiable goods relative to free imports and not because of an increase in tariff 
rates. These increases in imports were paid for by the massive increase in demand for 
Australian commodity exports. They were also followed by a sharp fall as the boom 
terminated. 
As Australia entered its post-industrial stage of development, the need for 
protection declined, with or without a commodity price boom. As the service sector 
became more and more important both in terms of employment and GDP shares, the 
support for protecting manufacturing jobs to maintain high living standards faded. There 
was across-the-board cut in tariff rates in 1973 and the trend continued till the current 
boom (Lloyd 2008).  
In summary, the federal government responded to the terms of trade shocks by 
raising tariffs to prevent deindustrialization and manufacturing unemployment only when 
politicians thought it mattered. This was certainly the case during the early 1920s when a 
vibrant manufacturing sector was closely associated with national defence, national pride 
and fairness. Protectionist policies also served the government well as a redistribution 
instrument during the depression. The need for such policies diminished when 
manufacturing underwent its post-war boom and more recently when services became the   24
dominant sector. 
Table 8 confirms that the Australian government enjoyed big revenue gains 
during export commodity booms. The average growth rate of revenue during the first half 
of the 1920s was 6.8 percent, a half a percentage point higher than the previous decade 
(not shown). Payment to the states as a share of total government expenditure was 9 
percent. Revenue growth slumped to 4.5 percent during the commodity price bust across 
the late 1920s.
10 But note that revenues did not fall during the bust, suggesting that the 
federal government’s income sources were sufficiently diverse to mute the impact of the 
commodity price slump. Also, both the shares of payment to the states and subsidies 
increased during this time, suggesting an effort to smooth the regional impact on the 
downside of the price cycle. The revenue growth rate during the Korean War almost 
doubled from 6.9 to 12.3 percent on either side of 1950, showing how unimportant 
commodity prices were as a determinant of government revenues by mid-century. State 
transfers also increased, but it appears unlikely that they were driven by a response to the 
price cycle.  
                       Table 8: Australian Government Finances during the Shocks 
Years  Revenue Growth Rate 
(%) 
Payment to States as a 
share of total 
expenditure 
Subsidies and 
Bounties as a share of 
total expenditure 
1920 – 2007  
1920 – 25 
1925 – 30 
1945 – 50 
1950 – 55  



















 Source: 1920 – 25, 1925 – 32, 1945 – 53 are calculated using Vamplew (1987: pp. 252 and 258). The 
other figures are from the RBA Statistical Bulletin except the 2000-07 figures which are from the ABS cat 
no. 55120 Table 130. 
                                                 
10 It slumped even more, of course, during the Great Depression.   25
 
The revenue increase during the recent boom was 6.6 percent, only two thirds of the 
growth experienced during the Korean War, but almost equal to the early 1920s. The 
share of transfer to the states also increased significantly compared to previous episodes. 
True, this resulted in large part from the introduction of the GST (Goods and Services 
Tax) by the Howard Government in July 2000, phasing out several state and territory 
taxes, stamp duties and levies with a promise that the commonwealth would return a 
proportion of that revenue to the states through the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) mechanism. Thus, the big state redistributive share may not be the result of a 
conscious redistribution policy driven by commodity export price shocks, but it is 
certainly consistent with it. 
Table 9 reports the growth rate of government gross capital formation during the 
terms of trade shocks. During the upside of the 1920s price shock, government 
investment grew at an average rate of 4.4 percent, which was less than revenue growth, 
suggesting an expenditure smoothing policy. Yet, government investment in 
infrastructure projects such as posts and telegraph, roads, railways, and educational bricks 
and mortar collapsed during the slump in the late 1920s. Indeed, when revenue growth 
fell from 6.8 to 4.5 percent per annum, government investment growth became negative. 
This hardly can be viewed as a stabilization policy, but rather the contrary. Thus, there is 
very little evidence that the federation government used investment as an expenditure 
smoothing device during the price and revenue cycle in the 1920s. The Korean War 
episode generated a similar policy response. The overall growth in government 
investment between 1945 and 1950 was a spectacular 22.3 percent per annum, more than 
six times that of the 1920s boom. Posts and telegraph, roads, and railways all experienced   26
very rapid growth but the growth of government investment in housing and education 
were unmatched in Australian modern history. 
As with the downside in the late 1920s, after the 1950 peak, and with the  
        
Table 9: Growth Rate of Government Gross Capital Formation  
Years Aggregate  Posts  and 
Telegraph 
Roads Railways  Housing  Education 
1920 – 25 
1925 – 30 
1945 – 50 
1950 – 55  































Source: 1920 – 25, 1925 – 32, 1945 – 53 are calculated using Barnard and Butlin (1981). The 2000-07 
aggregate figure is from the ABS cat no. 5206 Table 2.        
 
commodity price bust, government investment growth fell by half, although the recorded 
12.7 percent per annum was still a very big number. 
In contrast, the recent commodity price boom coincides with a drop in aggregate 
government investment. This break with the past can be explained, of course, by an 
ideological shift in the role of government, not by some change in views regarding how 
to smooth expenditures over commodity price cycles. Perhaps the government response 
to the ongoing collapse of base metal prices will reveal more about the historical 
persistence of Australian policy response to these external price shocks. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has focused on Australian terms of trade history since Federation in   27
1901. It identifies two major price shock episodes before the recent mining-led episode, 
and assesses their relative magnitude, their de-industrialization and distributional impact, 
factor market responses and policy behaviour. In doing so, we are able to learn what 
external price shocks did to resource allocation, development and distribution in the 
Australian 20
th century, and thus to understand more about what it might do at the start of 
the Australian 21
st century.  
In spite of great commodity price volatility that matched most of the primary-
product exporting Third World, these price shocks never caused the same great volatility 
in the Australia economy either in aggregates like GDP or unemployment, or in sectoral 
and regional performance. Why? Was it because factor markets were better able to 
respond to external shocks? Apparently not. Was it because the Australian government 
had more stable revenues so as to pursue long run infrastructure investment without 
interruption, that is, to stabilize? Yes and no. Yes, revenues came from fairly diverse 
sources so that commodity price volatility did not produce as great revenue volatility. No, 
since the federal government made little effort to use countercyclical investment policy. 
Was it because Australia was better able to diversify and thus to mute the impact of the 
external price shocks? We think it was (is) diversification that made (makes) the 
difference – a big and growing industrial sector before about 1970, and a big and growing 
service sector after about 1970. More efficient factor markets and better institutions 
didn’t seem to matter much at all.      28
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Data Appendix 
 
PX : Export Price Index. Source: 1890 – 1949 is from Bambrick (1973). Bambrick publishes export price 
index in Table 1 with base average of three years ending June 1939 = 100; 1949/50 – 1996/97 is from RBA 
Historical Statistics (annual data - financial year averages) Table 5.6a, weblink 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/OP8ExcelFiles/5-6a&b.xls), base year 1989/90 = 100; 1996/97 – 2007 
from RBA Historical Statistics (quarterly data converted to annual, financial year averages) Table G04, 
weblink (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/G04hist.xls), chain value index, series ends March, 
2008. All series are adjusted to the base year 1989/90 = 100. 
PXW : Export Price Index of Wool. Source: 1901 – 1929 is from Bambrick (1970), p. 137, Table V/2, we 
use the index for pastoral produce as a proxy; 1930 – 1935 is from Vamplew (1987), pp. 215-216 and pp. 
82-83. We use weighted average (using production of greasy wool as weights) of wholesale wool price 
index in Victoria and NSW as a proxy; 1936 – 1948 is from Bambrick (1970), Table V/7; 1949 – 1990 is 
from RBA historical statistics, Table 1.12a: Export Price Index. For 1975 to 1990 "textile and fibres export 
price index' is used as a proxy. 1991 – 2007 is from the ABS, cat no. 6457.0 - International Trade Price 




PXM : Export Price Index of Mining. Source: a) 1861 – 1939 is proxied by Mining Price Index in Australia, 
Vamplew (1987), Table PC 61-70, p. 217; 1940 is from Bambrick (1970), Table V/7. Bambrick reports 
separate index for Metal (which includes silver, copper, tin, zinc, lead) and Gold. These indices are 
averaged using metal and gold production as weights from Vamplew (1987), Tables: ME1-6 & ME7-12, 
pp. 88-89; 1941 – 1948 is from Vamplew (1987), Table PC 61-70, p. 217. The proxy used is the price index 
of Mining industry; 1949 – 1974 is from RBA Historical Statistics, Table 1.12a. The export price index of 
metals and coal is used as a proxy for Mining; 1975 – 2007 is from the ABS (cat no. 6457.0 International 
Trade Price Indexes, Australia, Table 19. Export Price Index by Selected ANZSIC Industry of Origin 
Division & Subdivision, Index Numbers). Financial year averages are calculated. All indices are converted 
to the base 1989/90 = 100, financial year average. 
PXA : Export Price Index of Agriculture. Source: 1861 – 1900 is proxied by Agriculture Price Index in 
Australia, Vamplew (1987), Table PC 61-70, p. 217; 1901 – 1928 is from Bambrick (1970), Table V/2; 
1929 – 1939 is from Vamplew (1987), Table PC 61-70, p. 217. The proxy used is the price index of 
Agriculture; 1940 – 1948 is from Bambrick (1970), Table V/7, proxied by the export price index of wheat; 
1949 – 1978 is from RBA Historical Statistics, Table 1.12a. The export price index of cereals is used as a 
proxy for Agriculture; 1979 – 2007 is from the ABS (cat no. 6457.0 International Trade Price Indexes, 
Australia, Table 19. Export Price Index by Selected ANZSIC Industry of Origin Division & Subdivision,   34
Index Numbers). Financial year averages are calculated and the export price index of agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing is used as a proxy. All indices are converted to the base 1989/90 = 100, financial year average.          
PM : Import Price Index. Source: 1890 – 1949 is from Bambrick (1973). Bambrick publishes import price 
index in Table 1 with base average of three years ending June 1939 = 100; 1949/50 – 1996/97 from RBA 
Historical Statistics (annual data - financial year averages) Table 5.6a, weblink 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/OP8ExcelFiles/5-6a&b.xls), base year 1989/90 = 100; 1996/97 – 2007 
from RBA Historical Statistics (quarterly data converted to annual, financial year averages) Table G04, 
weblink (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/G04hist.xls), chain value index, series ends March, 
2008. All series are adjusted to the base year 1989/90 = 100. 
PY : GDP Deflator. Source: 1901 – 1949 is from Butlin (1977). This series is with 1967 = 100 as the base 
year; 1950 – 1996 is from RBA Historical Statistics (financial year averages) Table 5.6a: Implicit Price 
Deflators for Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product, column 'Gross Domestic Product GDP (E)', weblink 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/OP8ExcelFiles/5-6a&b.xls). This series is with 1990 = 100 as the base 
year; 1997 – 2007 is from RBA Historical Statistics (quarterly data) Table: G04 OTHER PRICE 
INDICATORS, column Gross Domestic Product chain price indices (2006 = 100 as the base year), 
converted into financial year averages (ie. average of Sep t-1, Dec t-1, Mar t, Jun t), weblink: 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/G04hist.xls). We make adjustments so that the entire series is 
with 1990 = 100 as the base year. 
RealGDP at 1990 constant prices. Source: 1901 – 1949 is from Butlin (1977). This is evaluated at 1967 = 
100 constant price; 1950 – 1996 is from RBA Historical Statistics (financial year averages) Table 5.2a: 
Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices, column 'Gross Domestic Product GDP(E)', 
weblink (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/OP8ExcelFiles/5-2a&b.xls). This is evaluated at 1990 constant 
price; 1997 – 2007 is from RBA Historical Statistics (quarterly data) Table: G11  GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT - EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS, column Gross Domestic Product chain volume measure 
(measured at 2006 prices), converted into financial year averages (ie. average of Sep t-1, Dec t-1, Mar t, 
Jun t), weblink: (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/G11hist.xls). We make adjustments so that the 
entire series is measured in 1990 constant prices. 
SCHGDP: Structural Change in GDP. Source: Defined as St = Si wi |gi,t - gt| , where wi are the Value 
added share weights, gi and g are one year growth rates of individual industrial sectors and the GDP 
respectively. This index ranges between zero (when all sectors grow at the same rate as the GDP and hence 
there is no structural change) and one.  Calculated on 13 sectors (pastoral, agriculture, mining, dairying 
forestry fisheries, manufacturing, construction, private water transport, public business undertakings, 
government services, finance, distribution, other services, house rent) for the period 1900-1939 using 
Vamplew (1987), p. 133 data. Index for the period 1949 to 1960 is constructed by using Haig (1966). This 
is calculated on 8 sectors (Primary industry, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, building and 
construction, gas water and electricity, trade and transport, finance and property, other industries). Index for 
the period 1963 to 1974 is constructed by using p. 199 of Norton, W. and P. Kennedy. (1985). This is   35
calculated on 10 sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, gas water and electricity, 
wholesale and retail trade, transport, finance, public administration and entertainment,  ownership of 
dwellings). 1975 to 1995 is from RBA Historical Statistics, Table 5-10. This is calculated on 18 sectors 
(agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity gas and water, wholesale trade, retail trade, 
accommodation, transport and storage, communication, finance and insurance, property business services, 
government administration, education, health and community services, cultural recreational services, 
personal and other services, ownership of dwellings). Finally, 1996 to 2007 is from ABS data (cat no. 
5204.0) - Australian System of National Accounts, Table 9. Industry Gross Value Added: Chain Volume 
Measure in $m(a). This is calculated on 18 sectors (agriculture forestry and fishing, mining, manufacturing, 
construction, electricity gas and water, wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation cafes and restaurants, 
transport and storage, communication services, finance and insurance, property and business services, 
government administration and defence, education, health and community services, cultural recreational 
services,  personal and other services,  ownership of dwellings).  
SCHEMP: Structural Change in Employment. Source: Defined as St = Si wi |gi,t - gt| , where wi are the 
employment share weights, gi and g are one year growth rates of employment in individual industrial 
sectors and the economy respectively. This index ranges between zero (when employment in all sectors 
grow at the same rate as the aggregate and hence there is no structural change) and one.  Calculated on 7 
sectors (rural, mining, manufacturing, gas electricity and water, building and construction,  trade and 
transport, finance property and others) for the period 1911-1980 using Withers et al. (1985) data. Index for 
the period 1981 to 1997 is constructed by using RBA Historical Statistics Table 4-10. This is calculated on 
6 sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction,  trade and transport, finance and others). 
Finally, index for the period 1998 to 2007 is constructed by using ABS data (cat no. 6291.0.55.033) - 
Labour force, Australia, Detailed, Quarterly, May 2008, Table 04. Quarterly data coverted to annual by 
averaging. This is calculated on 7 sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, gas electricity and water, 
construction,  trade and transport, finance and others).  
Average Duty. Source: Average duty (customs plus primage, net) - dutiable clearances only, adjusted for 
revenue duties: from Lloyd (2008).   36
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